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ABSTRACT 	  In	  1953	  the	  British	  and	  United	  States	  overthrew	  the	  democratically	  elected	  Iranian	  Prime	  Minister	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh	   in	  what	  was	   the	   first	   covert	   coup	  d’état	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Headlines	  and	  stories	  perfectly	  echoed	  the	  CIA	  and	  administration’s	  cover	  story	  –	  a	  successful	  people’s	  revolution	  against	  a	  prime	  minister	  dangerously	  sympathetic	  to	  communism.	  This	  storyline	  is	  drastically	  dissimilar	  to	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  clandestine	  operation.	  	  American	   mainstream	   media	   wrongly	   represented	   the	   proceedings	   through	   Iran	  strictly	  Cold	  War	  terms	  rather	  than	  placing	  it	  in	  it	  rightful	  context	  as	  a	  product	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Iranian	   oil	   nationalization	   crisis.	   In	   relying	   on	   narrow	  Cold	  War	   ideologies,	  the	  press	  disguised	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  the	  events	  and	  kept	  the	  American	  public	  blind	  to	  the	  realities.	  Furthermore,	  a	  complacent	  and	  silent	  press	  allowed	  the	  overthrow	  of	   the	   nationalist	   Prime	  Minister	   –	   one	   of	   Iran’s	  most	   democratic	   leaders	   –	   to	   go	  unchallenged	  in	  public	  spheres	  of	  deliberation	  and	  enabled	  its	  tragic	  consequences	  to	  go	  concealed	  and	  unexamined.	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CHRONOLOGY: 	  
October	  1949	  –	  Formation	  of	  the	  National	  Front	  
April	  1951	  –	  Mossadegh	  named	  prime	  minister;	  Oil	  Nationalization	  Law	  passed	  
May	  1951	  –	  Shah	  ratified	  Oil	  Nationalization	  Law	  
June	  1951	  –	  NIOC	  takes	  over	  industry	  	  
July	  13,	  1952	  –	  Mossadegh	  seeks	  special	  powers	  for	  six	  months	  	  
July	  13,	  1952	  –	  Mossadegh	  resigns	  	  
July	  21,	  1952	  –	  “Siyeh-­‐e	  Tir”	  –	  Mass	  uprisings	  
July	  22,	  1952	  –	  Mossadegh	  renamed	  prime	  minister	  
October	  1952	  –	  Break	  in	  Anglo-­‐Iranian	  relations;	  All	  British	  citizens	  must	  leave	  
July	  8,	  1953	  –	  Eisenhower	  announces	  no	  aid	  	  
July	  14,	  1953	  –	  National	  Front	  deputies	  resign	  from	  Majles	  	  
August	  3,	  1953	  –	  Referendum	  to	  dissolve	  Majles	  
August	  15,	  1953	  –	  Failed	  coup;	  Shah	  flies	  to	  Baghdad	  	  
August	  19,	  1953	  –	  Coup	  
August	  21,	  1953	  –	  Shah	  returns	  
October	  1953	  –	  U.S.	  grants	  Iran	  $45	  million;	  AIOC	  renamed	  British	  Petroleum	  
September	  1954	  –	  Consortium	  Oil	  Agreement	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INTRODUCTION: 
 
THE UNITED STATES, IRAN AND MOSSADEGH From	  the	  ashes	  of	  World	  War	  II	  rose	  a	  new	  geopolitical	  power	  structure	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  the	  leading	  superpowers.	  As	  the	  design	  of	  a	  post-­‐war	  world	  commenced,	  it	  became	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  each	  held	  highly	  conflicting	  economic	  and	  political	  views.	  This	  competition	  for	  power,	  coupled	  with	  an	  intense	  mutual	  distrust,	  quickly	  manifested	  as	  the	  bipolar	  ideological	  struggle	  between	  the	  Capitalist	  West	  and	  Communist	  East	  known	  as	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  The	  nearly	  half	  a	  century	  long	  struggle	  never	  materialized	  as	  a	  conflict	  of	  direct	  military	  combat	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Soviets.	  Instead,	  it	  played	  out	  across	  the	  globe	  through	  a	  series	  of	  local	  conflicts	  understood	  purely	  through	  the	  bipolar	  prism	  of	  the	  great	  East-­‐West	  divide.	  One	  of	  the	  earliest	  of	  such	  conflicts	  involved	  Iran	  and	  the	  covert	  coup	  d’état	  of	  the	  democratically	  elected	  Prime	  Minister	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh	  (1882-­‐1967)	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1953.	  	  The	  fall	  of	  Mossadegh	  was	  portrayed	  in	  American	  media	  as	  popular	  uprising	  against	  an	  incompetent	  prime	  minister.	  However,	  the	  realities	  of	  his	  demise	  and	  the	  reinstatement	  of	  Shah	  Mohammad	  Reza	  Pahlavi	  (1919-­‐1980)	  were	  drastically	  dissimilar.	  This	  changeover	  of	  power	  was	  ultimately	  the	  product	  of	  a	  clandestine	  coup	  orchestrated	  by	  the	  United	  States’	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  –	  an	  operation	  that	  would	  remain	  publicly	  veiled	  and	  misunderstood	  for	  decades	  to	  come,	  only	  to	  be	  more	  recently	  reconstructed	  through	  various	  materials,	  including	  private	  government	  documents,	  correspondences,	  memoirs	  and	  many	  sanitized	  reports.	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In	  presenting	  a	  contextual	  and	  cohesive	  understanding	  of	  the	  events	  of	  the	  coup	  d’état	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  and	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh	  were	  portrayed	  in	  the	  media	  at	  the	  time,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  coup	  was	  a	  product	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Iranian	  oil	  nationalization	  crisis	  and,	  while	  the	  British	  may	  have	  been	  the	  instigators,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  United	  States	  was	  direct.	  However,	  despite	  certain	  speculation,	  American	  media	  picked	  up	  on	  neither	  of	  these	  critical	  elements.	  Instead,	  the	  covert	  operation	  read	  as	  a	  completely	  internal	  matter	  –	  a	  popular	  revolt	  brought	  about	  by	  widespread	  dissatisfaction	  with	  Mossadegh’s	  ineffectiveness	  and	  incompetence.	  This	  succession	  of	  events	  appeared	  perfectly	  plausible	  and	  palatable	  to	  the	  American	  public	  because	  the	  press	  consistently	  relied	  on	  a	  Cold	  War	  ideological	  narrative	  that	  (1)	  falsely	  stressed	  the	  communist	  threat	  and	  (2)	  employed	  a	  distinctly	  condemning	  and	  imperialist	  rhetoric	  to	  characterize	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Iran.	  This	  passive,	  deceptive,	  and	  ultimately	  silent	  narrative	  allowed	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  coup	  d’état	  –	  and	  its	  disastrous	  long-­‐term	  consequences	  –	  to	  go	  unexamined	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  	  	   	  	  
SITUATING THE TOPIC Many	  books	  and	  essays	  on	  American	  foreign	  policy	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  are	  essentially	  oblivious	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  policy-­‐making,	  intelligence-­‐gathering,	  war-­‐making,	  and	  mainstream	  politics	  are	  profoundly	  shaped	  by	  a	  social	  and	  cultural	  world	  beyond	  the	  conference	  table	  and	  the	  battlefield.	  However,	  political	  struggles	  are	  created	  and	  defined	  within	  a	  particular	  historical	  and	  cultural	  context,	  and	  thus	  the	  two	  are	  irrefutably	  connected.	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   In	  their	  book	  The	  U.S.	  Press	  and	  Iran,	  William	  Dorman	  and	  Mansour	  Farhang	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  politics	  and	  culture,	  focusing	  on	  American	  news	  media	  and	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Iran	  between	  1951	  and	  1978.	  They	  explain	  that	  while	  the	  press	  cannot	  make	  foreign	  or	  defense	  policy,	  it	  does	  assist	  in	  setting	  the	  
boundaries	  within	  which	  policy	  is	  made.	  Or	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  press	  “frames	  a	  highly	  generalized	  sense	  of	  things:	  of	  what	  is	  required	  and	  of	  what	  is	  not;	  of	  who	  is	  enemy	  and	  who	  is	  friend.	  The	  press	  sets	  the	  broad	  limits	  of	  our	  thinking	  about	  the	  ‘other.’”1	  While	  I	  am	  not	  focusing	  on	  the	  explicit	  relationship	  between	  press	  and	  policy,	  Dorman	  and	  Farhang’s	  fluid	  understanding	  of	  the	  media’s	  role	  in	  shaping	  a	  general	  atmosphere	  within	  which	  political	  conflicts	  are	  conceived	  remains	  critical.	  	  Another	  related	  and	  critical	  source	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Mary	  Ann	  Heiss.	  Between	  her	  book,	  Empire	  and	  Nationhood:	  The	  United	  States,	  Great	  Britain	  and	  Iranian	  Oil,2	  and	  essay,	  “Real	  Men	  Don’t	  Wear	  Pajamas,”3	  Heiss	  insightfully	  explores	  the	  oil	  nationalization	  crisis	  and	  Western	  media’s	  portrayal	  of	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh	  through	  a	  cultural	  and	  gender	  based	  analysis.	  Furthermore,	  she	  places	  these	  depictions	  in	  a	  context	  relevant	  to	  Iran.	  	  A	  sufficient	  amount	  of	  scholarly	  work	  specifically	  focuses	  on	  the	  events	  of	  the	  coup	  itself.	  The	  work	  of	  accredited	  historian	  Ervand	  Abrahamian,	  including	  his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  William	  A.	  Dorman	  and	  Mansour	  Farhang,	  The	  U.S.	  Press	  and	  Iran:	  Foreign	  
Policy	  and	  the	  Journalism	  of	  Deference	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California,	  1988),	  19	  (emphasis	  added).	  2	  Mary	  Ann	  Heiss,	  Empire	  and	  Nationhood:	  The	  United	  States,	  Great	  Britain,	  
and	  Iranian	  Oil,	  1950-­‐1954	  (Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1997).	  	  
3	  Mary	  Ann	  Heiss,	  "Real	  Men	  Don’t	  Wear	  Pajamas:	  Anglo-­‐American	  Cultural	  Perceptions	  of	  Mohammed	  Mossadeq	  and	  the	  Iranian	  Oil	  Nationalization	  Dispute,"	  in	  Empire	  and	  Revolution:	  The	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Third	  World	  Since	  1945,	  ed.	  by	  Peter	  L.	  Hahn	  and	  Mary	  Ann	  Heiss	  (Columbus:	  Ohio	  State	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  178-­‐194.	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journal	  article	  “The	  1953	  coup	  in	  Iran”4	  and	  recently	  published	  book	  The	  Coup,	  5	  provides	  the	  most	  updated,	  informed	  and	  definitive	  “reconstruction”	  of	  the	  coup.	  I	  rely	  principally	  on	  these	  two	  sources	  in	  my	  summary	  of	  the	  coup.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  pertinent	  to	  mention	  two	  other	  relevant	  accounts:	  Moyara	  de	  Moraes	  Ruehsen’s	  journal	  article	  “Operation	  ‘Ajax’	  Revisited”6	  and	  Mark	  Gasiorowski’s	  “The	  1953	  coup	  d’état	  in	  Iran.”7	  	  In	  re-­‐examining	  and	  drawing	  on	  the	  various	  sources	  aforementioned,	  while	  also	  incorporating	  my	  own	  analysis	  of	  primary	  media	  sources,	  I	  seek	  to	  present	  a	  contextualized	  and	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  coup	  d’état,	  how	  the	  events	  of	  August	  1953	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  were	  portrayed	  in	  American	  popular	  press,	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  such	  representations.	  I	  then	  conclude	  by	  briefly	  examining	  the	  haunting	  legacies	  of	  the	  covert	  operation	  itself.	  	  	  
COLD WAR CONTEXT: AMERICAN EMPIRE AND THE THIRD WORLD  The	  clandestine	  operation	  that	  overthrew	  Prime	  Minister	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh	  –	  one	  of	  Iran’s	  most	  democratic	  leaders	  –	  was	  born	  out	  of	  the	  particular	  cultural	  and	  political	  context	  that	  was	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Justified	  by	  the	  threat	  of	  communist	  subversion,	  the	  United	  States	  intervened	  in	  a	  wide	  series	  of	  proxy	  wars,	  covert	  coups,	  and	  counterinsurgencies,	  engaging	  a	  variety	  of	  satellite	  regimes.	  These	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Ervand	  Abrahamian,	  "The	  1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,"	  Science	  &	  Society	  (2001):	  182-­‐215.	  	  5	  Ervand	  Abrahamian,	  The	  Coup:	  1953,	  the	  CIA,	  and	  the	  Roots	  of	  Modern	  US-­‐
Iranian	  Relations	  (New	  Press,	  2013).	  6	  Moyara	  de	  Moraes	  Ruehsen,	  "Operation	  ‘Ajax’	  Revisited:	  Iran,	  1953,"	  Middle	  
Eastern	  Studies	  29,	  no.	  3	  (1993):	  467-­‐486.	  7	  Mark	  J.	  Gasiorowski,	  "The	  1953	  coup	  d'etat	  in	  Iran,"	  International	  Journal	  of	  
Middle	  East	  Studies	  19,	  no.	  03	  (1987):	  261-­‐286.	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regimes	  –	  many	  of	  whom	  were	  brutal	  dictators	  –	  became	  the	  cores	  of	  American	  modern	  empire.	  Thus,	  by	  assuming	  world	  leadership	  and	  global	  responsibility	  in	  its	  insistence	  on	  “spreading	  democracy”	  and	  defending	  the	  “Free	  World”	  against	  Soviet	  political	  domination,	  American	  policymakers	  at	  once	  denied	  imperialism	  and	  enacted	  it.	  Consequently,	  this	  ideological	  rhetoric	  that	  defined	  the	  Cold	  War	  period	  operated	  as	  a	  guise	  of	  what	  is	  arguably	  an	  imperial	  project.	  	  The	  term	  ‘imperialism’	  used	  here	  is	  not	  synonymous	  to	  its	  historical	  definition	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  one	  state’s	  legal	  dominion	  over	  another.	  This	  new	  notion	  of	  imperialism	  is	  born	  in	  today’s	  postcolonial	  world	  of	  ‘neo-­‐colonialism’	  –	  the	  practice	  of	  using	  capitalism,	  globalization,	  cultural	  forces,	  satellite	  regimes	  and	  covert	  action	  to	  marginalize	  and	  control	  a	  country.	  In	  the	  same	  awareness,	  ‘American	  Empire’	  thrives	  on	  the	  denial	  of	  imperial	  ambition	  and	  falls	  under	  the	  modern	  notion	  of	  empire,	  which	  “lies	  concealed	  beneath	  some	  ideological	  barrier	  or	  juridical	  concept	  –	  commonwealth,	  alliance,	  free	  world,	  the	  West,	  the	  Communist	  bloc	  –	  that	  disguises	  the	  actual	  relationships	  among	  its	  members.”8	  Furthermore,	  Cold	  War	  history	  cannot	  be	  narrowly	  defined	  as	  a	  conflict	  of	  interests	  and	  ideology	  between	  two	  superpowers.	  The	  mainstream	  understanding	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  paradigm	  as	  an	  “East-­‐West	  conflict”	  severely	  distorts	  the	  lived	  experiences	  of	  the	  global	  struggle.	  Within	  this	  global	  bipolarization,	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  Third	  World	  took	  shape	  and	  with	  it	  a	  neutral,	  anti-­‐imperialist,	  nationalist,	  ideological	  and	  political	  project,	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Non-­‐Aligned	  Movement.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Chalmers	  Johnson,	  Blowback:	  The	  costs	  and	  consequences	  of	  American	  
empire	  (Metropolitan	  Books,	  2001),	  19.	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Throughout	  the	  nearly	  half-­‐century	  long	  conflict,	  the	  Third	  World	  occupied	  a	  critical	  space	  both	  ideologically	  and	  geographically	  –	  a	  role	  that	  is	  too	  often	  overlooked.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  as	  a	  purely	  ideological	  conflict	  fundamentally	  contradicts	  the	  wider	  non-­‐western,	  postcolonial	  experience	  of	  the	  Third	  World.	  Critical	  attention	  must	  be	  paid	  to,	  “the	  reality	  of	  tragic	  mass	  death	  embedded	  in	  this	  history,	  [and]	  the	  enduring	  legacy	  of	  the	  tragedy	  in	  the	  societies	  once	  seized	  by	  radical	  and	  violent	  bipolarization	  of	  social	  and	  political	  forces.”9	  Under	  the	  veils	  of	  ideology	  and	  discourse,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  United	  States	  engaged	  in	  a	  series	  of	  violent	  and	  often	  ironic	  ‘interventions’	  that	  crushed	  hopes	  for	  any	  form	  of	  organic	  democracy	  and	  consumed	  many	  of	  these	  countries	  in	  vicious	  civil	  wars	  and	  various	  forms	  of	  organized	  political	  violence.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  history	  and	  understanding	  of	  American	  empire	  and	  the	  Third	  World	  that	  the	  coup	  d’état	  of	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh	  takes	  place.	  	  
LEADING UP TO THE COUP Before	  getting	  into	  the	  specific	  events	  of	  the	  coup,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  look	  at	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  operation	  manifested.	  As	  touched	  on,	  throughout	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Washington	  and	  the	  CIA	  viewed	  the	  world	  as	  an	  ideological	  battleground	  and	  saw	  every	  local	  conflict	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  the	  great	  East-­‐West	  confrontation.	  Furthermore,	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  many	  CIA	  agents	  and	  numerous	  government	  officials	  became	  convinced	  of	  the	  moral	  superiority	  of	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  forces.	  Each	  held	  an	  idealistic	  and	  romantic	  view	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  U.S.	  values	  in	  its	  struggle	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Heonik	  Kwon,	  The	  other	  cold	  war	  (Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  4.	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against	  communism.	  The	  CIA	  in	  particular	  shared	  a	  defining	  conviction	  that	  they	  were	  doing	  the	  “vital	  dirty	  work	  of	  freedom.”10	  	  The	  early	  1950s	  marked	  a	  period	  of	  heightened	  Cold	  War	  paranoia.	  The	  “fall”	  of	  China	  to	  the	  Communist	  party	  in	  October	  of	  1949	  sparked	  resilient	  anti-­‐communist	  sentiments	  throughout	  Washington	  and	  the	  greater	  United	  States	  public.	  In	  the	  ‘if	  you’re	  not	  with	  us,	  you’re	  against	  us’	  climate,	  any	  country	  not	  decisively	  allied	  with	  the	  United	  States	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  potential	  enemy.	  This	  atmosphere	  would	  be	  a	  defining	  factor	  in	  not	  only	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Iran,	  but	  also	  the	  way	  it	  was	  portrayed	  by	  the	  media	  and	  received	  by	  the	  public.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Iran,	  while	  it	  was	  never	  an	  official	  colony,	  the	  country’s	  independence	  was	  “violated	  whenever	  it	  suited	  European	  Great	  Powers	  to	  do	  so.	  Cultural	  disrespect,	  economic	  domination	  and	  imperial	  manipulation	  characterized	  Europe’s	  relationship	  with	  Iran	  for	  much	  of	  the	  century	  leading	  up	  to	  1950.”11	  One	  of	  such	  means	  of	  exploitation	  was	  the	  British	  dominated	  Anglo-­‐Iranian	  Oil	  Company	  established	  in	  1908.	  The	  subsequent	  oil	  agreement	  signed	  by	  Reza	  Shah	  –	  Muhammad	  Reza’s	  father	  –	  in	  1933	  provided	  a	  new	  sixty-­‐year	  concession	  and	  further	  positioned	  Iran’s	  economic	  development	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  Europeans.	  However,	  with	  the	  resignation	  of	  Reza	  Shah	  in	  1941	  and	  the	  ensuing	  turbulent	  social	  and	  political	  scene,	  new	  opportunities	  for	  political	  activity	  opened	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Stephen	  Kinzer,	  All	  the	  Shah's	  men:	  An	  American	  coup	  and	  the	  roots	  of	  
Middle	  East	  terror	  (John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons	  2008),	  4.	  	  11	  William	  L.	  Cleveland	  and	  Martin	  P.	  Bunton,	  A	  history	  of	  the	  modern	  Middle	  
East	  (Vol.	  2.	  Boulder,	  CO:	  Westview	  Press,	  1994),	  269.	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up.12	  Thus	  the	  first	  twelve	  years	  of	  Muhammad	  Reza	  Shah’s	  reign	  was	  marked	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  domestic	  unrest	  and	  foreign	  pressure,	  which	  he	  and	  his	  government	  had	  difficultly	  effectively	  navigating.	  Within	  this	  climate	  of	  unrest	  rose	  the	  charismatic	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh	  –	  a	  staunch	  nationalist	  with	  a	  fierce	  vision	  of	  an	  independent	  Iran	  free	  from	  the	  shackles	  of	  any	  form	  of	  imperialism	  or	  foreign	  influence	  –	  both	  Western	  and	  Eastern.	  	  A	  leader	  of	  a	  populist,	  antiroyalist	  movement,	  Mossadegh	  was	  known	  for	  his	  support	  of	  parliamentary	  democracy	  and	  strong	  opposition	  to	  foreign	  activity	  in	  Iran.	  Furthermore,	  he	  earned	  a	  reputation	  among	  the	  Iranian	  people	  as	  a	  politician	  of	  immaculate	  honesty	  and	  integrity.	  Born	  into	  a	  landed	  aristocratic	  family,	  Mossadegh	  was	  educated	  in	  Europe	  and	  earned	  his	  doctorate	  in	  law.	  In	  1915,	  he	  entered	  state	  service	  and	  for	  the	  next	  several	  years	  led	  an	  active	  political	  life	  as	  cabinet	  minister,	  provincial	  governor,	  and	  Majlis	  (parliament)	  deputy.	  	  Under	  Mossadegh’s	  leadership,	  in	  1949	  several	  political	  parties	  and	  interest	  groups	  –	  brought	  together	  by	  their	  common	  opposition	  to	  foreign	  influence	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  royal	  authority	  –	  formed	  the	  National	  Front.	  Their	  goals	  included:	  replace	  the	  personal	  rule	  of	  the	  monarch	  with	  the	  rule	  of	  constitutional	  law,	  make	  the	  military	  subject	  to	  the	  will	  of	  the	  parliament	  rather	  than	  the	  sovereign,	  redistribute	  the	  wealth	  and	  land	  of	  the	  privileged	  elite,	  and	  ultimately	  establish	  an	  alternative	  to	  royal	  autocracy.13	  	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh	  and	  his	  campaign	  for	  nationalism	  successfully	  captured	  the	  imagination	  of	  the	  people,	  and	  in	  April	  1951	  he	  was	  democratically	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Cleveland	  and	  Bunton,	  A	  history,	  267.	  	  13	  Cleveland	  and	  Bunton,	  A	  history,	  269.	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  14	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  187.	  15	  Cleveland	  and	  Bunton,	  A	  history,	  268.	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CHAPTER ONE: THE COUP AND THE PRESS 	  
RECONSTRUCTING THE COUP The	  origins	  of	  the	  coup	  are	  ultimately	  rooted	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐Iranian	  oil	  crisis	  of	  1951-­‐1953.	  As	  touched	  on	  earlier,	  the	  Anglo-­‐Iranian	  Oil	  Company	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  typical	  colonial	  power	  manipulating	  the	  host	  government	  and	  playing	  on	  the	  hierarchies	  of	  a	  divided	  society	  for	  its	  own	  benefit.	  However,	  in	  April	  of	  1951,	  under	  the	  nationalist	  campaign	  led	  by	  the	  popular	  Prime	  Minister,	  Iran	  nationalized	  its	  oil;	  twenty-­‐eight	  months	  later	  Premier	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh	  was	  overthrown.	  	  	  By	  June	  1951,	  the	  majlis	  passed	  the	  Oil	  Nationalization	  Law	  and	  set	  up	  the	  National	  Iranian	  Oil	  Company	  with	  Iran	  as	  the	  new	  authority.	  Throughout	  the	  crisis,	  Mossadegh	  was	  insistent	  on	  national	  sovereignty,	  which	  meant	  control	  over	  the	  extraction,	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  oil;	  control	  was	  the	  one	  matter	  that	  the	  British	  also	  were	  insistent	  on	  maintaining.	  Thus,	  although	  compromise	  may	  have	  externally	  seemed	  a	  possibility,	  behind	  the	  scenes	  neither	  side	  was	  willing	  to	  budge	  on	  this	  defining	  issue.	  Abrahamian	  explicitly	  lays	  out	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  situation:	  “[the	  British	  government	  realized]	  either	  Iran	  obtained	  control;	  or	  it	  did	  not.	  	  Mossadeq	  knew	  the	  same…	  the	  British	  drew	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  crisis	  could	  end	  only	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  Mossadeq.”	  16	  What	  ensued	  was	  a	  propagandist	  campaign	  carried	  out	  by	  planting	  stories	  that	  discredited	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  Furthermore,	  the	  British	  also	  worked	  to	  undermine	  the	  Mossadegh	  systematically	  by	  increasing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  189.	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economic	  pressures	  through	  various	  means	  including	  embargos.	  Iran,	  thus,	  had	  to	  survive	  on	  an	  oil-­‐less	  economy.17	  	  When	  these	  attempts	  at	  destabilization	  and	  ultimate	  abdication	  failed	  –	  a	  testament	  to	  Mossadegh’s	  political	  prowess	  and	  popular	  support	  –	  the	  British	  took	  one	  more	  bid	  at	  dislocation.	  After	  the	  mass	  uprisings	  and	  three	  days	  of	  bloodshed	  known	  as	  Siyeh-­‐e	  Tir	  (July	  21)	  –	  which	  ended	  with	  the	  Shah	  giving	  Mossadegh	  the	  power	  to	  appoint	  the	  chiefs	  of	  staff	  and	  the	  war	  minister	  –	  the	  British	  saw	  an	  opportunity	  within	  this	  “sharp	  clash	  between	  the	  Shah	  and	  the	  Government”	  and	  began	  conspiring	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister.18	  However,	  a	  suspicious	  Mossadegh	  ordered	  the	  British	  embassy	  shut	  in	  October	  1952,	  and	  all	  British	  diplomats	  in	  Iran,	  including	  the	  MI6	  agents	  working	  under	  diplomatic	  cover,	  were	  forced	  to	  leave	  the	  country.19	  Now	  unable	  to	  carry	  out	  any	  sort	  of	  coup	  d’état,	  the	  British	  immediately	  turned	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  harnessed	  the	  CIA.	  	  When	  the	  British	  turned	  to	  President	  Truman	  for	  assistance	  in	  carrying	  out	  a	  possible	  coup,	  he	  was	  explicitly	  reluctant	  and	  stressed	  using	  only	  economic	  measures	  and	  constitutional	  means	  to	  remove	  Mossadegh.	  However,	  the	  American	  attitude	  toward	  a	  possible	  coup	  in	  Iran	  changed	  radically	  with	  the	  election	  of	  President	  Dwight	  D.	  Eisenhower	  in	  November	  1952.	  The	  new	  Republican	  administration	  differed	  markedly	  in	  its	  assessment	  of	  the	  crisis.	  While	  Truman	  attempted	  to	  remain	  generally	  neutral	  and	  pushed	  for	  a	  more	  peaceful	  solution,	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  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  195.	  18	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  195-­‐196.	  19	  Kinzer,	  All	  the	  Shah’s	  men,	  3.	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Eisenhower	  and	  his	  administration	  viewed	  the	  situation	  in	  strictly	  Cold	  War	  terms	  and	  were	  eager	  to	  take	  action.	  	  	  Days	  after	  Eisenhower	  was	  elected	  president,	  Christopher	  Montague	  Woodhouse,	  a	  senior	  British	  agent	  of	  the	  MI6,	  met	  with	  top	  CIA	  and	  State	  Department	  officials.	  Stephen	  Kinzer	  insightfully	  sums	  up	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  interaction:	  	  “Woodhouse	  shrewdly	  decided	  not	  to	  make	  the	  traditional	  British	  argument,	   which	   was	   that	   Mossadegh	   must	   go	   because	   he	  nationalized	  British	  property.	  That	  argument	  did	  not	  arouse	  much	  passion	   in	   Washington.	   Woodhouse	   knew	   what	   would.	   ‘Not	  wishing	  to	  be	  accused	  of	  trying	  to	  use	  the	  Americans	  to	  pull	  British	  chestnuts	  out	  of	   the	   fire,’	  he	  wrote	   later,	   ‘I	  decided	   to	  emphasize	  the	   Communist	   threat	   to	   Iran	   rather	   than	   the	   need	   to	   recover	  control	  of	  the	  oil	  industry.’”20	  	  	  The	  appeal	  was	  calculated	  to	  engage	  the	  powerful	  and	  famed	  Dulles	  brothers:	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  and	  director	  of	  the	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  Allen	  Welsh	  Dulles.	  Among	  the	  fiercest	  Cold	  Warriors,	  the	  pair	  drove	  American	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  time	  and	  established	  the	  unfortunate	  pattern	  of	  global	  intervention	  that	  defined	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Code-­‐named	  ‘Operation	  Ajax,’	  the	  final	  plans	  of	  the	  coup	  were	  signed	  by	  British	  Prime	  Minister	  Winston	  Churchill	  on	  July	  1	  and	  President	  Eisenhower	  on	  July	  11.21	  General	  Fazlollah	  Zahedi	  –	  Mossadegh’s	  first	  Interior	  Minister	  –	  was	  chosen	  as	  the	  best	  coup	  candidate	  to	  replace	  Mossadegh.	  And	  while	  the	  British	  were	  unable	  to	  formally	  carry	  out	  the	  coup,	  they	  brought	  a	  variety	  of	  essential	  contributions	  to	  the	  whole	  venture.	  This	  included	  select	  experts	  on	  Iran,	  an	  informal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Kinzer,	  All	  the	  Shah’s	  men,	  3-­‐4.	  	  21	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  197.	  
	   18	  
network	  within	  the	  armed	  forces,	  a	  long-­‐standing	  civilian	  network,	  as	  well	  as	  connections	  and	  regular	  meetings	  with	  a	  long	  array	  of	  influential	  politicians.	  22	  	  The	  Americans,	  meanwhile,	  brought	  the	  more	  explicit	  assets	  –	  including	  the	  embassy	  compound	  in	  Tehran,	  its	  diplomats	  and	  operatives.	  Kermit	  Roosevelt,	  the	  CIA	  chief	  for	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  grandson	  of	  President	  Theodore	  Roosevelt,	  was	  appointed	  field	  commander	  and	  director	  of	  the	  coup.	  The	  main	  architect	  of	  the	  operation	  and	  expert	  on	  Iran	  would	  be	  Dr.	  Donald	  N.	  Wilber	  –	  a	  secret	  service	  officer	  who	  had	  traveled	  throughout	  the	  Middle	  East	  since	  the	  1930s	  under	  various	  guises.23	  Other	  key	  figures	  include	  Richard	  Cottam,	  a	  young	  CIA	  operative	  in	  Tehran,	  and	  Loy	  Henderson,	  the	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  Iran.	  The	  CIA	  also	  had	  at	  least	  four	  local	  agents:	  Colonel	  Abbas	  Farzanegan,	  a	  desk	  officer	  who	  spent	  time	  in	  Washington	  but	  was	  also	  familiar	  with	  many	  of	  the	  field	  officers	  in	  Tehran,	  Ehsam	  Lankarani,	  the	  “agent	  provocateur”	  and	  Tudeh	  activist	  known	  for	  being	  a	  “daredevil	  revolutionary,”	  and	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Boscoe	  Brothers,”	  both	  of	  whom	  held	  strategic	  positions	  with	  Iranian	  press	  outlets	  and	  also	  brought	  with	  them	  strong	  ties	  to	  the	  mobs	  and	  gang	  groups.24	  	  In	  the	  months	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  coup,	  the	  propagandist	  campaign	  against	  Mossadegh	  intensified	  and	  weapons	  were	  “dropped	  quietly”	  to	  the	  tribes	  and	  groups	  backing	  the	  Shah.25	  However,	  as	  the	  plot	  gathered	  momentum,	  it	  was	  Mohammad	  Reza	  Shah	  who	  began	  to	  prove	  himself	  an	  obstacle.	  Initially	  hesitant	  and	  indecisive,	  it	  took	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  persuasion	  for	  him	  to	  agree	  with	  the	  plans.	  It	  still	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  Abrahamian,	  The	  Coup,	  151-­‐154.	  23	  Kinzer,	  All	  the	  Shah’s	  men,	  162.	  24	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  198-­‐202.	  25	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  203.	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remains	  unclear	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  Shah	  himself	  actually	  signed	  the	  royal	  decree	  dismissing	  Mossadegh	  as	  prime	  minister	  and	  naming	  General	  Zahedi	  in	  his	  place.	  Based	  on	  assessments	  of	  a	  personal	  interaction	  with	  Donald	  Wilber	  in	  1969,	  Abrahamian	  indicates,	  “Wilber	  had	  to	  forge	  the	  royal	  signature	  –	  which	  means	  the	  legal	  cover	  for	  the	  coup	  was	  itself	  bogus.”26	  Either	  way,	  the	  Shah	  ultimately	  had	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  cooperate.	  Both	  the	  CIA	  and	  the	  MI6	  worked	  closely	  to	  stiffen	  the	  Shah’s	  resolve,	  assuring	  him	  both	  that	  the	  coup	  was	  feasible	  and	  that	  the	  two	  powers	  were	  fully	  behind	  it.27	  	  With	  the	  critical	  backing	  of	  several	  royalist	  military	  forces	  in	  Iran,	  the	  plan	  for	  the	  coup,	  as	  explained	  by	  Abrahamian,	  was	  strikingly	  simple:	  	  In	   the	   middle	   of	   one	   night,	   Colonel	   Nehmatollah	   Nasiri,	   the	  commander	   of	   the	   700-­‐man	   Imperial	   Gaurds,	   was	   to	   take	   on	  armored	   car,	   six	   officers	   and	   two	   truck-­‐loads	   of	   soldiers,	   and,	   in	  one	   clear	   swoop,	   arrest	   the	   chief	   of	   staff	   and	   the	   leading	  ministers…	   Nasiri	   was	   then	   to	   proceed	   to	   Mossadeq’s	   residence	  and	  deliver	  him	  the	  royal	  decree	  dismissing	  him.	   If	  he	  refused	   to	  abide	   by	   the	   decree,	   Nasiri	   was	   to	   arrest	   him	   too.	   Meanwhile,	  another	   contingent	   of	   the	   Imperial	   Guards	  was	   to	   cut	   the	   phone	  lines	  to	  the	  bazaar	  and	  take	  over	  the	  main	  communications	  center	  as	  well	  as	  the	  headquarters	  of	  the	  chiefs	  of	  state.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Zahedi	  was	   to	   head	   a	   tank	   convoy	   to	   the	   radio	   station	  where	   he	  would	  read	  the	  royal	  decree	  naming	  him	  premier.	  28	  	  Moreover,	  to	  give	  the	  coup	  a	  “veneer	  of	  popular	  support,”	  the	  Boscoe	  brothers	  among	  others	  were	  to	  gather	  a	  “motely	  crew”	  and	  proceed	  to	  the	  radio	  station	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  203.	  27	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  202.	  28	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  205.	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looting	  the	  homes	  of	  cabinet	  ministers	  and	  the	  offices	  of	  pro-­‐Mossadegh	  organizations.29	  	  	   When	  the	  coup	  was	  put	  into	  effect	  it	  the	  late	  hours	  of	  August	  15,	  it	  was	  expected	  to	  succeed	  with	  little	  resistance	  or	  obstacle.	  However,	  it	  quickly	  went	  off	  track	  when	  an	  Imperial	  Guard	  member,	  later	  suspected	  of	  being	  a	  secret	  Tudeh	  affiliate,	  tipped	  off	  his	  party’s	  leaders	  who	  then	  divulged	  the	  plan	  to	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  Thus,	  instead	  of	  Nasiri	  arresting	  Mossadegh	  as	  planned,	  Mossadegh	  had	  Nasiri	  arrested	  and	  dismissed	  the	  decree	  as	  illegitimate	  arguing	  the	  Shah	  did	  not	  have	  constitutional	  authority	  to	  remove	  prime	  ministers.30	  Almost	  immediately,	  the	  Shah	  fled	  on	  his	  plane	  to	  Baghdad,	  and	  the	  clandestine	  operation	  seemed	  to	  prove	  disastrously	  unsuccessful.	  	  	   However,	  Kermit	  Roosevelt	  quickly	  improvised	  a	  new	  plan.	  The	  four	  army	  brigades	  still	  under	  royalist	  control	  would	  carry	  out	  the	  arrests	  and	  occupy	  the	  various	  strategic	  positions.	  But	  in	  order	  for	  the	  royalist	  brigades	  to	  inconspicuously	  obtain	  ammunition	  from	  closely	  guarded	  depots	  without	  sparking	  off	  a	  counter-­‐reaction,	  Roosevelt	  devised	  an	  ingenious	  idea:	  “Mossadeq	  would	  be	  hoodwinked	  into	  calling	  the	  brigades	  himself.”31	  	  	   On	  August	  17	  the	  American	  Ambassador	  –	  Loy	  Henderson	  –	  returned	  to	  Tehran	  after	  a	  “prolonged	  vacation”	  (so	  as	  to	  be	  absent	  during	  the	  coup)	  and	  requested	  an	  urgent	  meeting	  with	  Premier	  Mossadegh.	  When	  the	  two	  met	  privately	  the	  next	  day:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  206.	  30	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  207.	  31	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  207.	  	  
	   21	  
Henderson	  began	  hinting	   that	  Washington	  was	  not	   sure	  whether	  Mossadeq	  was	  still	  the	  lawful	  prime	  minister...	  [and]	  continued	  by	  warning	   him	   that	   Iran	   could	   not	   possibly	   expect	   U.S.	   sympathy	  while	   crowds	   roamed	   the	   streets	   threatening	  American	  property	  and	   shouting	   ‘Yankee	   Go	   Home!’	   [Henderson]	   threatened	   to	  evacuate	  all	  Americans	  unless	   firm	  and	  prompt	  action	  was	   taken	  to	  establish	  law	  and	  order…	  Conversely,	  Henderson	  implicitly	  held	  out	  the	  promise	  if	  such	  action	  was	  taken	  the	  United	  States	  would	  consider	  further	  assistance.32	  	  	  The	  adamant	  U.S.	  ambassador	  tactically	  stressed	  the	  failure	  of	  Iranian	  law	  enforcement	  to	  protect	  American	  lives	  amidst	  the	  angry	  crowds	  who	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  pulling	  down	  royal	  statues	  and	  denouncing	  not	  only	  the	  Shah,	  but	  Westerners	  as	  well.	  While	  some	  of	  these	  demonstrations	  were	  spontaneous	  reactions	  to	  the	  attempted	  overthrow	  of	  the	  popular	  Prime	  Minister,	  coupist	  agents	  also	  intentionally	  and	  strategically	  buttressed	  the	  rallies.33	  Noisily	  acting	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Tudeh	  Party,	  these	  fabricated	  demonstrations	  worked	  to	  augment	  the	  
threatening	  presence	  of	  the	  Eastern-­‐oriented	  party.	  And,	  as	  Abrahamian	  puts	  it,	  “Mossadegh	  fell	  for	  the	  bait.”34	  	  Then	  and	  there,	  with	  Henderson	  in	  the	  room,	  Mossadegh	  called	  the	  military	  governor	  of	  Tehran	  and	  ordered	  him	  to	  “clear	  the	  streets.”35	  Thus	  under	  the	  direct	  orders	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  August	  19	  conveniently	  began	  with	  the	  imperial	  brigades	  moving	  into	  the	  city	  to	  ‘establish	  law	  and	  order,’	  while	  his	  supporters	  from	  the	  National	  Front	  and	  Tudeh	  Party	  avoided	  the	  streets.	  The	  royalist	  military	  forces	  then	  carried	  out	  the	  original	  coup	  plan;	  they	  occupied	  the	  communication	  centers,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  208.	  33	  Abrahamian,	  The	  Coup,	  188.	  34	  Abrahamian,	  The	  Coup,	  190.	  35	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  210.	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released	  the	  royalists	  who	  had	  been	  detained,	  arrested	  the	  chief	  of	  staff	  and	  leading	  ministers,	  and	  continued	  on	  to	  the	  home	  of	  the	  premier.	  By	  the	  afternoon	  twenty-­‐seven	  tanks	  seized	  the	  residence	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  Three	  hours	  later	  Mossadegh	  was	  arrested,	  and	  the	  coup	  was	  declared	  a	  success.36	  	  
 
U.S. PRESS AND THE “THREAT OF COMMUNISM” After	  reconstructing	  the	  events	  of	  the	  coup,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  operation	  was	  a	  product	  of	  the	  oil	  nationalization	  crisis	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  United	  States	  was	  not	  only	  direct,	  but	  also	  extended	  beyond	  the	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  to	  include	  the	  Pentagon	  and	  State	  Department.	  However,	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  nationalist	  Prime	  Minster	  and	  reinstatement	  of	  the	  Shah	  played	  out	  in	  Western	  mainstream	  media	  as	  an	  entirely	  internal	  matter.	  	  From	  its	  beginnings	  in	  1951,	  the	  portrayal	  of	  the	  nationalization	  crisis	  itself	  was	  highly	  refracted	  by	  British	  and	  American	  popular	  press.	  Throughout	  the	  dispute,	  the	  British	  maintained	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  accept	  a	  “reasonable	  compromise.”	  However,	  behind	  the	  scenes	  British	  officials	  were	  unmoving	  in	  their	  insistence	  to	  maintain	  control	  and	  concluded	  that	  the	  crisis	  could	  only	  end	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  Mossadegh.	  And	  when	  negotiations	  began	  to	  break	  down,	  British	  press	  releases	  attributed	  this	  to	  “Iranian	  intransigence.”37	  	  More	  recently	  still,	  the	  New	  
York	  Times	  cover	  article	  from	  2000	  –	  which	  summarized	  Dr.	  Donald	  Wilber’s	  leaked	  confidential	  report	  on	  the	  coup	  –	  repeated	  verbatim	  Wilber’s	  claim	  that	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  209-­‐210.	  	  37	  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  190-­‐191.	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negotiations	  collapsed	  entirely	  because	  of	  Mossadegh.38	  Thus	  almost	  fifty	  years	  later,	  the	  U.S.	  press	  continued	  to	  obscure	  the	  real	  underlying	  nature	  and	  proceedings	  of	  the	  oil	  crisis.	  	  	   Around	  the	  confused	  final	  days	  of	  Mossadegh’s	  authority,	  the	  American	  press	  passively	  opted	  for	  a	  simple	  narrative	  that	  perfectly	  matched	  the	  narrow	  bipolar	  Cold	  War	  ideology	  of	  the	  era	  –	  the	  communist	  threat.	  Consistently	  stressing	  the	  imminent	  “threat	  of	  communist	  take	  over”	  in	  Iran,	  media	  stories	  at	  once	  considerably	  augmented	  both	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Tudeh	  and	  it’s	  association	  with	  the	  communist	  Soviet	  Union.	  On	  August	  10,	  1953,	  for	  example,	  Newsweek	  ran	  a	  CIA	  planted	  article	  titled	  “Iran,	  Reds…taking	  over,”	  39	  which	  very	  clearly	  implied	  that	  the	  country	  was	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  falling	  into	  the	  communist	  abyss	  and	  claimed	  that	  Mossadegh	  was	  about	  to	  make	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  Soviets.	  	  On	  August	  17,	  1953	  –	  the	  day	  of	  the	  first	  attempt	  at	  the	  coup	  –	  the	  
Washington	  Post	  reported:	  “Young	  Shah	  Mohammed	  Reza	  Pahlavi	  fled	  Iran	  today	  after	  Communist-­‐supported	  Premier	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh	  smashed	  a	  midnight	  attempt	  by	  the	  Shah’s	  imperial	  guards	  to	  overthrow	  him.”40	  The	  Christian	  Science	  
Monitor	  ran	  a	  similar	  story	  the	  following	  day	  under	  the	  headline,	  “Reds	  Bolster	  Mossadegh	  Grip.”41	  And	  Time	  magazine’s	  article	  –	  “99.93%	  Pure”42	  –	  explicitly	  equates	  Mossadegh	  to	  Hitler	  and	  Stalin	  and	  positions	  him	  as	  undemocratic	  and	  dangerously	  sympathetic	  to	  communism.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   38	  James	  Risen,	  "Secrets	  of	  history:	  the	  CIA	  in	  Iran,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  April	  16,	  2000.	   39	  “Iran,	  Reds…taking	  over,”	  Newsweek,	  August	  10,	  1953.	  	  40	  Washington	  Post,	  August	  17,	  1953).	  	  41	  Christian	  Science	  Monitor,	  August	  18,	  1953.	  	  42	  “99.93%	  Pure,”	  Time	  Magazine,	  August	  17,	  1953.	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   Following	  the	  successful	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  Shah’s	  reinstatement,	  press	  articles	  covering	  the	  proceedings	  portrayed	  the	  clandestine	  operation	  as	  a	  people’s	  revolution	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  Shah.	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  article	  –	  “ARMY	  SEIZES	  HELM”	  –	  from	  August	  19,	  1953	  claims	  to	  provide	  a	  “straight	  forward”	  account	  of	  the	  successful	  “Royalist	  uprising.”43	  A	  Newsweek	  article	  published	  on	  August	  31,	  1953	  explains	  the	  events	  as	  “a	  wholly	  internal	  matter	  brought	  about	  by	  widespread	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  ineptitude	  of	  Mossadegh.”44	  And	  a	  piece	  published	  the	  same	  day	  in	  Time	  magazine,	  titled	  “Iran:	  the	  People	  Take	  Over,”	  explicitly	  clarifies:	  “this	  was	  no	  military	  coup,	  but	  a	  spontaneous	  popular	  uprising.”45	  This	  conception	  of	  the	  coup	  as	  a	  popular	  revolt	  disguised	  and	  distorted	  the	  actual	  nature	  of	  the	  events.	  	  	   	   The	  overall	  sentiment	  among	  the	  media	  on	  the	  final	  outcome	  was	  (unsurprisingly)	  positive	  and	  optimistic.	  As	  Dorman	  and	  Farhang	  point	  out:	  “The	  press	  was	  content	  to	  quickly	  offer	  a	  warm	  welcome	  back	  to	  the	  Shah	  and	  to	  reach	  a	  consensus	  that	  Iran	  had	  been	  spared	  a	  Communist	  takeover	  only	  by	  the	  narrowest	  of	  margins.”46	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  in	  a	  front-­‐page	  article	  headlined	  “Shah	  Instituted	  Iranian	  Reforms,”	  began	  by	  telling	  readers	  the	  young	  Shah	  was	  completely	  unlike	  his	  despot	  father	  and	  had	  begun	  widespread	  reforms	  before	  the	  crisis	  began.47	  Furthermore,	  on	  August	  20,	  1953,	  the	  Washington	  Post	  wrote:	  “if	  indeed	  the	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  Kennett	  Love,	  “ARMY	  SEIZES	  HELM,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  August	  19,	  1953.	  	  44	  “Shah	  Return	  in	  Triumph	  as	  Army	  Kicks	  Out	  Mossadegh,”	  Newsweek,	  August	  31,	  1953.	  45	  Time	  (August	  31,	  1953)	  (Iran:	  the	  People	  Take	  Over)	  46	  Dorman	  and	  Farhang,	  All	  the	  Shah’s	  men,	  48.	  47	  New	  York	  Times,	  August	  21,	  1953.	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Mossadegh	  regime	  now	  has	  been	  overturned,	  there	  will	  be	  cause	  to	  rejoice.”48	  The	  following	  day	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  expressed	  “a	  deep	  sense	  of	  relief	  in	  the	  West”	  at	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  “rabid,	  self-­‐seeking	  nationalist.”49	  This	  underlying	  sense	  of	  assurance	  and	  relief	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  position	  and	  indolently	  subscribes	  to	  the	  rampant	  ideology	  of	  the	  time.	  	  	   	   The	  media’s	  reliance	  on	  the	  narrow	  lenses	  of	  Cold	  War	  ideology	  ultimately	  had	  severe	  consequences.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  press	  both	  exaggerated	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Tudeh	  party	  in	  Iran,	  while	  also	  completely	  conflating	  the	  Marxist	  oriented	  group	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  American	  public	  was	  thus	  easily	  able	  to	  digest	  and	  overly	  content	  accept	  the	  false	  storyline	  of	  an	  Iranian	  ‘people’s	  revolution’	  that	  destroyed	  the	  looming	  Soviet	  threat	  by	  dismissing	  a	  dictatorial	  and	  communist	  prone	  prime	  minister.	  However,	  Mossadegh	  –	  a	  stanch	  nationalist	  –	  only	  tolerated	  the	  Tudeh’s	  existence	  and	  did	  not	  actively	  seek	  its	  support.	  And	  while	  the	  Tudeh	  supported	  the	  nationalization	  of	  Iranian	  oil,	  they	  expressed	  disdain	  for	  the	  Prime	  Minster.50	  Furthermore,	  relatively	  recent	  retrospective	  memoirs	  by	  Tudeh	  party	  members	  suggest	  that	  they	  should	  have	  supported	  Mossadegh	  more	  ardently	  and	  that	  in	  fact	  their	  main	  concern	  at	  the	  time	  was	  to	  get	  equal	  access	  to	  the	  oil	  fields.51	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  Washington	  Post,	  August	  20,	  1953.	  49	  New	  York	  Times,	  August	  21,	  1953.	  50	  Foran,	  John.	  "Discursive	  Subversions:	  Time	  Magazine,	  the	  CIA	  Overthrow	  of	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  in	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  War	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Political	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  States	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  1945-­‐1966,	  ed.	  by	  Christian	  G.	  Appy	  (University	  of	  Massachusetts	  Press,	  2000),	  159.	  51	  Professor	  Janet	  Bauer	  (Trinity	  College).	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The	  hollowness	  of	  the	  Tudeh	  threat	  and	  a	  potential	  communist	  Iran	  is	  further	  underlined	  by	  the	  level	  at	  which	  the	  fear	  of	  the	  Tudeh	  had	  to	  be	  artificially	  created	  by	  the	  CIA.	  Scholar	  Mark	  Gasiorowski	  explains	  that	  on	  August	  17	  U.S.	  funding	  –	  of	  about	  $50,000	  –	  was	  used	  to:	  “hire	  a	  large	  crowd	  that	  marched	  into	  central	  Tehran	  shouting	  Tudeh	  slogans,	  carrying	  signs	  denouncing	  the	  Shah,	  tearing	  down	  statues	  of	  the	  Shah	  and	  his	  father…	  This	  crowd	  played	  the	  role	  of	  an	  agent	  provocateur:	  It	  generated	  fear	  of	  a	  Tudeh	  takeover.”52	  Thus,	  if	  the	  fear	  of	  Tudeh	  takeover	  had	  to	  be	  deliberately	  bolstered,	  the	  veracity	  of	  the	  threat	  could	  not	  have	  been	  of	  substance.	  Furthermore,	  Britain’s	  conscious	  decision	  to	  “emphasize	  the	  Communist	  threat	  of	  Iran	  [to	  the	  U.S.]	  rather	  than	  the	  need	  to	  recover	  control	  of	  the	  oil	  industry”	  also	  supports	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  artificial	  threat	  fashioned	  to,	  as	  MI6	  agent	  Christopher	  Woodhouse	  puts	  it,	  “arouse..	  passion	  in	  Washington.”53	  Evidently,	  this	  strategy	  proved	  effective.	  	  In	  more	  recent	  years,	  it	  has	  become	  known	  that	  the	  CIA	  and	  State	  Department	  actually	  knew	  the	  threat	  was	  not	  of	  real	  substance.	  As	  explained	  by	  Abrahamian,	  “the	  ‘communist	  danger’	  was	  more	  of	  a	  rhetorical	  device	  than	  a	  real	  issue…	  [The	  American	  government]	  knew	  that	  the	  Tudeh,	  even	  though	  the	  largest	  political	  organization,	  was	  in	  no	  position	  to	  seize	  power.”54	  	  Furthermore,	  Dean	  Acheson	  –	  Truman’s	  Secretary	  of	  State	  –	  was	  later	  honest	  enough	  to	  explain	  that	  there	  was	  no	  such	  ‘communist	  danger’	  behind	  the	  existing	  claims.	  The	  Tudeh	  issue,	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  Mark	  J.	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  in	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  53	  Kinzer,	  All	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he	  admitted,	  was	  essentially	  a	  smokescreen.	  55	  Additionally,	  Dorman	  and	  Farhang’s	  interview	  with	  Kennett	  Love	  –	  the	  main	  New	  York	  Times	  reporter	  in	  Tehran	  at	  the	  time	  –	  further	  confirms	  this	  misrepresentation	  of	  communist	  takeover.	  Love	  concedes,	  “I	  don’t	  think	  there	  was	  ever	  any	  likelihood	  of	  the	  Tudeh	  taking	  over	  Iran.”56	  Looking	  back	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  imminent	  threat	  of	  a	  communist	  Iran	  led	  by	  Premier	  Mossadegh	  –	  the	  conception	  that	  dominated	  American	  media	  –	  is	  verifiably	  false	  and	  fabricated.	  	  	  
FAILURE TO UNCOVER Nevertheless,	  there	  were	  a	  handful	  of	  articles	  that	  alluded	  to	  U.S.	  involvement	  in	  the	  events	  surrounding	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  For	  instance,	  an	  eerily	  perceptive	  article	  –	  titled	  	  “Old	  Mossy	  on	  the	  Way	  Out?”	  –	  was	  published	  on	  July	  13,	  1953	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Post.	  The	  article	  not	  only	  suggested	  Mossadegh’s	  fall	  to	  an	  army-­‐led	  coup,	  but	  also	  noted	  on	  the	  army’s	  close	  ties	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  author	  of	  the	  column,	  Robert	  S.	  Allen,	  also	  quoted	  Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  saying:	  “Any	  Iranian	  government,	  other	  than	  a	  Communist	  one,	  would	  be	  better	  for	  us	  than	  the	  present	  government.	  We	  have	  found	  it	  impossible	  to	  deal	  with	  Mossadegh.”	  57	  However,	  the	  media	  never	  picked	  up	  on	  this	  implicit	  chain	  of	  logic	  leading	  from	  the	  State	  Department	  to	  the	  Iranian	  army	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  coup.	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  Kermit	  Roosevelt,	  Countercoup,	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  (New	  York:	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  Dorman	  and	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  Post,	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A	  New	  York	  Times	  article	  by	  Kennett	  Love,	  published	  on	  August	  18,	  also	  mentioned	  “growing	  [Iranian]	  press	  accusations	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Henderson	  himself	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  weekend's	  bloodless	  stroke	  and	  counter-­‐stroke	  exchanged	  between	  the	  Court	  and	  the	  Government.”58	  This	  lead	  was	  never	  followed	  up	  on.	  And	  on	  August	  20,	  1953,	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  ran	  an	  article	  –	  “Moscow	  says	  U.S.	  Aided	  Shah’s	  Coup”	  –	  reporting	  “the	  United	  States	  has	  been	  pictured	  [by	  Soviet	  news	  outlets]	  as	  actively	  intervening	  in	  Iranian	  affairs	  and	  as	  the	  inspirer	  of	  the	  attempted	  coup	  by	  the	  Shah;”	  however,	  the	  Times	  is	  explicit	  in	  dismissing	  the	  conviction	  as	  “propaganda	  media.”59	  	  The	  possibility	  of	  American	  involvement	  in	  the	  overthrow	  of	  Mossadegh	  is	  otherwise	  unmentioned	  in	  the	  media	  until	  over	  a	  year	  later	  when	  the	  Saturday	  
Evening	  Post	  ran	  a	  pieced	  titled	  “The	  Mysterious	  Doings	  of	  the	  CIA.”60	  This	  article	  was	  not	  only	  largely	  inaccurate,	  but	  was	  also	  prepared	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  CIA	  itself,	  interested	  in	  taking	  credit	  for	  the	  operation	  to	  improve	  “its	  image	  for	  efficiency.”61	  
The	  Nation	  also	  alluded	  to	  the	  untold	  story	  in	  a	  piece	  on	  Iran	  in	  late	  1954:	  “The	  inside	  story	  of	  the	  ‘popular	  revolt’	  which	  overthrew	  the	  Mossadegh	  regime	  in	  August	  last	  year	  will	  be	  known	  only	  after	  the	  various	  secret	  documents	  involved	  are	  made	  public.	  One	  may	  safety	  conjecture,	  however,	  that	  the	  story	  given	  to	  the	  press	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  Kennett	  Love,	  “Statues	  of	  Shahs	  Torn	  Down	  in	  Iran,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  August	  18,	  1953.	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  “Moscow	  says	  U.S.	  Aided	  Shah’s	  Coup,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  August	  20,	  1953.	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  Richard	  and	  Gladys	  Harkness,	  “The	  Mysterious	  Doings	  of	  CIA,”	  Saturday	  
Evening	  Post,	  November	  6,	  1954.	  61	  Dorman	  and	  Farhang,	  U.S.	  Press	  and	  Iran,	  49.	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did	  not	  tell	  the	  whole	  truth.”62	  And	  still	  the	  story	  remained	  unremarked	  on	  in	  popular	  press.	  The	  U.S.-­‐orchestrated	  successful	  coup	  d’état,	  however,	  was	  slowly	  and	  quietly	  established	  as	  historical	  fact.	  After	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  in	  1979,	  the	  mastermind	  of	  the	  operation,	  Kermit	  Roosevelt,	  published	  (with	  pride	  and	  critical	  editing)	  Countercoup	  –	  a	  book	  on	  the	  doings	  of	  the	  CIA	  in	  Iran.63	  More	  recently,	  the	  
New	  York	  Times	  article	  from	  April	  2000	  revealed	  the	  details	  of	  the	  leaked	  CIA	  report	  on	  the	  1953	  operation	  by	  Dr.	  Donald	  Wilber.	  The	  story	  ran	  under	  the	  headline	  “Secrets	  of	  History:	  The	  CIA	  In	  Iran”	  and	  was	  treated	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  the	  declassified	  files,	  which	  were	  supposed	  to	  have	  been	  released	  but	  had	  yet	  to	  surface.64	  Still,	  as	  expert	  Evrand	  Abrahamian	  notes,	  Wilber’s	  report	  –	  which	  is	  now	  available	  to	  the	  public	  –	  is	  “highly	  sanitized.”65	  	  In	  the	  report,	  Donald	  Wilber	  overlooks	  Kermit	  Roosevelt’s	  ‘ingenious	  idea’	  –	  the	  determinant	  element	  of	  the	  coup	  that	  duped	  Mossadegh	  into	  calling	  out	  the	  imperial	  forces	  himself.	  Wilber	  is	  also	  careful	  not	  to	  dwell	  on	  the	  participant	  role	  of	  those	  outside	  the	  CIA	  –	  including	  the	  State	  Department,	  the	  American	  ambassador	  Loy	  Henderson	  and	  President	  Eisenhower	  himself.66	  Otherwise	  though,	  in	  terms	  of	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  A.	  Kessel,	  “Iran’s	  Fabulous	  Oil	  and	  Some	  Popular	  Fables,”	  The	  Nation,	  September	  11,	  1954.	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  Roosevelt,	  Countercoup.	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  James	  Risen,	  "Secrets	  of	  history,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  2000.	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  Abrahamian,	  “1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,”	  182.	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  Clandestine	  Service	  History,	  Overthrow	  of	  Permier	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  of	  Iran	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  Paper	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  Dr.	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  N.	  Wilber,	  March	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  Published	  October	  1969.	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popular	  press,	  the	  coup	  d’état	  of	  one	  Iran’s	  most	  democratic	  leaders	  was	  silently	  accepted	  as	  history	  without	  any	  real	  media	  attention.	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CHAPTER TWO: THE MEDIA, MOSSADEGH AND IRAN 
 
WESTERN IMPERIAL CONCEPTIONS By	  August	  of	  1953,	  American	  public	  opinion	  had	  been	  aptly	  prepared	  for	  the	  Shah’s	  reinstatement	  as	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  had	  been	  thoroughly	  discredited	  by	  the	  U.S.	  press.	  The	  quick	  reversal	  of	  events	  that	  brought	  the	  Shah	  back	  and	  ended	  Mossadegh’s	  political	  career	  appeared	  perfectly	  understandable	  in	  the	  United	  States	  not	  only	  because	  of	  the	  “impending	  threat	  of	  communism,”	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  distinct	  characterizations	  of	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh,	  the	  Shah	  Mohammad	  Reza	  Pahlavi,	  and	  Iran	  that	  dominated	  the	  media.	  	  Throughout	  the	  oil	  nationalization	  crisis	  and	  the	  coup,	  Anglo-­‐American	  officials	  held	  Iranians	  –	  particularly	  Premier	  Mossadegh	  –	  to	  be	  inferior;	  regularly	  employing	  what	  Edward	  W.	  Said	  has	  termed	  orientalism	  when	  dealing	  with	  their	  Iranian	  adversaries.	  67	  Said	  explains	  that	  the	  ‘Orient’	  is	  a	  byproduct	  of	  the	  exclusionary	  process	  involved	  in	  defining	  Western	  identity.	  Furthermore,	  within	  this	  strict	  understanding	  of	  ‘us’	  versus	  ‘them,’	  orientalism	  also	  involves	  the	  idea	  of	  “European	  identity	  as	  a	  superior	  one	  in	  comparison	  with	  all	  the	  non-­‐European	  peoples	  and	  cultures.”68	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  sense	  of	  cultural	  superiority	  is	  ultimately	  internalized	  in	  American	  and	  European	  understandings	  of	  identity.	  	  Additionally,	  Said’s	  concept	  is	  inextricably	  tied	  to	  ideas	  of	  power	  and	  the	  imperialist	  mentality.	  By	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  this	  divided	  and	  shallow	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  Heiss,	  Empire	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  Edward	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  Orientalism	  (New	  York:	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understanding	  of	  identity	  had	  become	  “the	  hallmark	  of	  imperialist	  cultures	  as	  well	  as	  those	  cultures	  trying	  to	  resist	  the	  encroachments	  of	  Europe.”69	  And	  while	  the	  United	  States	  has	  historically	  never	  been	  an	  explicitly	  imperial	  power,	  after	  the	  Cold	  War	  the	  U.S.	  emerged	  as	  the	  last	  superpower	  and	  from	  the	  start	  of	  long	  conflict	  has	  largely	  operated	  as	  an	  imperial	  power.	  Though	  less	  discernible,	  Said’s	  concept	  of	  orientalism	  thus	  remains	  applicable.	  	  The	  pertinence	  of	  such	  mentality	  is	  revealed	  in	  examining	  the	  way	  in	  which	  officials	  and	  the	  media	  portrayed	  Iran	  and	  Mossadegh;	  throughout	  the	  oil	  nationalization	  crisis	  and	  subsequent	  coup	  d’état,	  each	  consistently	  employed	  ideas	  of	  orientalism	  and	  Western	  imperialist	  rhetoric.	  As	  explained	  by	  Mary	  Ann	  Heiss,	  state	  officials	  “wrote	  often	  about	  the	  ‘Iranian	  mentality’	  and	  the	  ‘Oriental	  mind’	  in	  vague,	  undefined	  terms.”70	  These	  prejudices	  were	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  views	  of	  government	  officials,	  but	  also	  permeated	  throughout	  the	  media.	  Journalists	  strongly	  relied	  on	  the	  false	  stereotypes	  and	  embedded	  patterns	  of	  cultural	  superiority	  underlying	  Western	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  
	  
MOSSADEGH, THE SHAH, AND IRAN 	   The	  language	  used	  to	  characterize	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh	  constantly	  condemned	  his	  personal	  quirks	  and	  eccentricities	  and	  portrayed	  him	  as	  inferior,	  childlike	  and	  even	  feminine	  –	  an	  unworthy	  leader	  by	  Western	  standards.	  The	  treatment	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minster	  in	  the	  U.S.	  press	  is	  well	  exemplified	  by	  Time	  magazine’s	  “Man	  of	  the	  Year”	  cover	  story.	  The	  article	  opens:	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  Culture	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  (Vintage,	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  Heiss,	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  Men	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Once	  upon	  a	  time,	  in	  a	  mountainous	  land	  between	  Baghdad	  and	  the	  Sea	  of	   Caviar,	   there	   lived	   a	   nobleman.	   This	   nobleman,	   after	   a	   lifetime	   of	  carping	  at	  the	  way	  the	  kingdom	  was	  run,	  became	  Chief	  Minister	  of	  the	  
realm.	  In	  a	  few	  months	  he	  had	  the	  whole	  world	  hanging	  on	  his	  words	  and	  deeds,	  his	  jokes,	  his	  tears,	  his	  tantrums.	  Behind	  his	  grotesque	  antics	  lay	   great	   issues	   of	   peace	   or	   war,	   progress	   or	   decline,	   which	   would	  affect	  many	  lands	  far	  beyond	  his	  mountains.71	  	  This	  language	  depicts	  the	  Mossadegh	  as,	  non-­‐urban,	  removed	  from	  reality	  and	  living	  in	  a	  fantastical	  –	  even	  fanatical	  –	  world.	  Additionally,	  the	  Prime	  Minster’s	  name	  does	  it	  appear	  on	  the	  cover	  and	  is	  not	  mentioned	  until	  the	  seventh	  paragraph.	  Instead	  he	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  an	  “old	  nobleman,”	  “willful	  little	  boy”	  and	  a	  “dizzy	  old	  wizard”	  among	  others.	  Other	  characterizations	  include	  “peculiar,”	  “mercurial,”	  “mind	  runs	  in	  a	  deep	  single	  track,”	  and	  refer	  to	  “the	  suicidal	  quality	  of	  his	  fanaticism.”72	  This	  rhetoric	  portrays	  him	  not	  as	  an	  educated,	  skilled,	  and	  charismatic	  prime	  minster,	  but	  as	  a	  caricature	  –	  a	  strange,	  narrow-­‐minded,	  immature	  and	  irrational	  lunatic	  of	  a	  leader.	  	   The	  press	  also	  used	  a	  gendered	  language	  when	  representing	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  which	  worked	  to	  denigrate	  him	  as	  not	  only	  as	  a	  political	  leader	  but	  as	  a	  man.	  Throughout	  the	  article,	  Mossadegh	  –	  the	  character	  –	  is	  imbued	  with	  an	  aura	  of	  emotionalism	  and	  frailty.	  For	  instance,	  he	  is	  repeatedly	  described	  as	  “frail”	  or	  “fragile;”	  “one	  who	  frequently	  bursts	  into	  tears	  or	  faints;”	  a	  “weeping,	  fainting	  leader”	  whose	  “acid	  tears	  dissolved	  one	  of	  the	  remaining	  pillars	  of	  a	  once	  great	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  Magazine	  (emphasis	  added).	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empire.”	  73	  In	  the	  gender-­‐driven	  culture	  of	  1950s	  America,	  these	  characteristics	  were	  held	  to	  be	  distinctly	  feminine,	  deeming	  Mossadegh	  unmanly	  and	  therefore	  unfit	  for	  office.	  	  However,	  these	  attributes	  and	  actions	  –	  condemned	  as	  unmanly	  and	  deplorable	  by	  Anglo-­‐American	  officials	  and	  media	  –	  were	  accepted	  forms	  of	  behavior	  in	  Iran.74	  As	  Mary	  Ann	  Heiss	  explains:	  “for	  the	  Iranian	  people	  [Mossadeq’s	  tears]	  were	  proof	  of	  [his]	  deep	  concern	  for	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  country,	  concern	  that	  was	  so	  strong	  that	  he	  was	  driving	  to	  tears	  when	  he	  thought	  about	  the	  plight	  to	  his	  fellow	  country	  men.”75	  These	  expressions	  of	  emotion,	  so	  vehemently	  denounced	  by	  the	  West,	  were	  the	  kinds	  of	  public	  displays	  that	  Iranians	  often	  expected	  from	  a	  leader.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  media	  often	  labeled	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh	  as	  a	  dictator	  –	  a	  word	  used	  in	  reference	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  as	  early	  as	  1952	  by	  Time	  magazine	  in	  the	  article	  “Call	  Me	  Dictator.”76	  	  However,	  by	  1953	  –	  when	  the	  United	  State’s	  fear	  (or	  perceived	  fear)	  that	  Iran	  would	  fall	  to	  the	  communists	  reached	  a	  crescendo	  –	  this	  authoritarian	  positioning	  of	  Mossadegh	  was	  prevalent.	  On	  August	  17,	  1953,	  the	  New	  
York	  Times	  began	  its	  editorial	  on	  the	  hectic	  situation	  by	  stating:	  “In	  a	  confused	  and	  so	  far	  bloodless	  revolt…	  Premier	  Mossadegh	  appears	  to	  have	  made	  himself	  the	  absolute	  dictator	  of	  Iran,	  who	  in	  the	  Persian	  tradition,	  may	  be	  reaching	  for	  the	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  Time	  Magazine,	  June	  11,	  1951);	  October	  15,	  1951;	  November	  12,	  1951;	  November	  30,	  1953.	  	  74	  Heiss,	  Empire	  and	  Nationhood,	  4.	  	  75	  Heiss,	  "Real	  Men	  Don’t	  Wear	  Pajamas,”	  188.	  	  76	  “IRAN:	  Call	  Me	  Dictator,”	  Time	  Magazine,	  August	  11,	  1952.	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throne	  itself.”77	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  echoed	  a	  similar	  concern	  under	  the	  headline	  “Rise	  of	  a	  Dictator.”78	  These	  conceptions	  presented	  Mossadegh	  in	  an	  increasingly	  reproving	  light.	  	  By	  comparison,	  Shah	  Mohammad	  Reza	  Pehlavi	  –	  whose	  sympathy	  to	  U.S.	  objectives	  earned	  him	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  respect	  in	  popular	  press	  –	  received	  a	  more	  positive	  characterization,	  but	  not	  without	  critical	  overtones.	  	  For	  example,	  
Time	  magazine	  describes	  the	  Shah	  as	  “intelligent	  and	  devoted	  to	  the	  welfare	  of	  his	  country,	  around	  which	  he	  pilots	  his	  own	  B17…”	  However	  he	  is	  “as	  insecure	  and	  distrustful	  as	  all	  other	  elements	  of	  Persian	  life.”79	  The	  distinct	  depictions	  of	  Mossadegh	  and	  the	  Shah	  are	  most	  clearly	  laid	  out	  in	  a	  New	  York	  Times	  article	  –	  “Week	  in	  Review:	  Reversal	  in	  Iran”	  –	  published	  just	  days	  after	  the	  coup:	  
The	  Shah,	  Mohammed	  Riza	  Pahlevi,	   is	   Iran's	   constitutional	  monarch,	  with	  the	  power	  to	  name	  the	  Premier.	  He	  is	  Commander	  in	  Chief	  of	  the	  army.	  He	  is	  young	  (33),	  likes	  to	  drive	  fast	  cars,	  flies	  his	  own	  plane,	  has	  a	  reputation	  for	  being	  pro-­‐Western	  and	  progressive	  in	  his	  social	  ideas.	  He	   also	   has	   a	   reputation	   for	   indecision.	   The	   Premier,	   Mohammed	  Mossadegh,	  is	  symbol	  of	  Iranian	  nationalism.	  He	  drove	  the	  British	  out	  of	   the	   Iranian	   oil	   fields-­‐-­‐a	   victory	   which	   brought	   him	   tremendous	  popularity.	  He	  is	  old	  (72	  by	  his	  own	  count)	  and	  internationally	  famous	  for	   his	   bizarre	   habits-­‐-­‐receiving	   diplomatic	   visitors	   in	   bed,	   weeping	  profusely	   and	   fainting	   in	   public,	   bounding	   upstairs	   like	   a	   rabbit	   at	  formal	  meetings.80	  	  The	  inclusion	  of	  such	  descriptions	  as	  “he	  pilots	  his	  own	  B17”	  and	  “likes	  to	  drive	  fast	  cars”	  –	  behaviors	  strongly	  correlated	  to	  mid-­‐century	  Western	  conceptions	  of	  masculinity	  –	  work	  to	  present	  him	  as	  true	  man	  and	  thus	  a	  capable	  leader.	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  New	  York	  Times,	  August	  17,	  1953.	  78	  Dorman	  and	  Farhang,	  U.S.	  Press	  and	  Iran,	  42.	  	  79	  “IRAN:	  Land	  of	  Insecurity,”	  Time	  Magazine,	  February	  5,	  1951.	  	  80	  “Week	  in	  Review:	  Reversal	  in	  Iran,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  August	  23,	  1953.	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Furthermore,	  the	  Shah	  is	  labeled	  as	  young	  and	  socially	  progressive,	  whereas	  the	  aging	  Prime	  Minister	  is	  marked	  by	  his	  “bizarre	  habits”	  and	  rendered	  as	  crazy	  and	  emotional.	  	  The	  patronizing	  language	  that	  worked	  to	  discredit	  Mossadegh	  of	  any	  authority	  or	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  leader	  was	  also	  broadly	  applied	  to	  Iran	  and	  Iranians	  in	  general.	  For	  instance	  Time	  magazine	  wrote:	  	  “Mossadegh,	  by	  Western	  standards	  an	  appalling	  caricature	  of	  a	  statesman,	  was	  a	  fair	  sample	  of	  what	  the	  West	  would	  have	  to	  work	  with	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.”81	  Iran	  is	  furthermore	  described	  as	  a	  “mountainous	  land”	  and	  “helpless	  country”	  and	  Iranians	  as	  an	  “ancient	  race”	  with	  a	  “fanatical	  state	  of	  mind.”	  Other	  media	  characterizations	  involve	  such	  phrases	  as:	  “illiterate	  masses,”82	  “Iran’s	  smelly	  politics,”	  “frenetically	  suspicious	  Iranians,”	  and	  “explosively	  chauvinistic	  Iran.”83	  One	  article	  goes	  as	  far	  as	  to	  describe	  Iran’s	  history	  as	  “a	  history	  of	  corruption,	  ignorance	  and	  greed.”84	  Rooted	  in	  ideas	  of	  orientalism,	  this	  rhetoric	  is	  reflective	  the	  West’s	  assumption	  that	  “the	  Iranian	  people	  were	  incapable	  of	  politics	  [and]	  that	  they	  were	  incapable	  of	  self-­‐rule.”85	  Such	  descriptions	  explicitly	  position	  the	  United	  States	  as	  innately	  superior	  to	  Iran	  and	  appeal	  both	  to	  imperialist	  discourses	  and	  notions	  of	  American	  empire.	  	  In	  total,	  the	  U.S.	  press	  once	  again	  relied	  on	  strict	  Cold	  War	  ideologies	  when	  engaging	  Iranian	  politics	  through	  its	  overall	  orientalist	  rhetoric	  and	  distinct	  characterizations.	  The	  media	  effectively	  portrayed	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh	  as	  a	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  “Man	  of	  the	  Year,”	  Time	  Magazine.	  82	  Life	  Magazine,	  November	  12,	  1951.	  	  	  83	  Time	  Magazine,	  March	  19,	  1951;	  August	  27,	  1951;	  October	  12,	  1953.	  	  84	  Time	  Magazine,	  August	  27,	  1951).	  85	  Dorman	  and	  Farhang,	  U.S.	  Press	  and	  Iran,	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highly	  irrational	  and	  discredited	  leader	  and	  the	  Shah	  as	  the	  obvious	  choice	  for	  the	  incapable	  country.	  This	  conception	  could	  not	  help	  but	  reinforce	  and	  continue	  to	  disguise	  the	  false	  narrative	  of	  the	  coup	  d’état	  offered	  by	  both	  the	  state	  and	  press.	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CONCLUSION: CONSEQUENCES	  The	  coup	  d’état	  of	  the	  democratically	  elected	  and	  widely	  popular	  Iranian	  Prime	  Minister	  had	  a	  material	  and	  fateful	  effect	  on	  Iran’s	  history	  as	  “the	  1953	  coup	  brought	  down	  an	  iron	  curtain	  on	  Iranian	  politics.”86	  It	  is	  justifiable	  to	  say	  that	  if	  the	  United	  States	  had	  not	  intervened	  in	  1953,	  the	  course	  of	  postwar	  Iranian	  history	  would	  have	  taken	  a	  drastically	  different	  direction.	  	  	  The	  demise	  of	  the	  Mossadegh’s	  nationalist	  administration	  reestablished	  the	  royal	  autocracy	  of	  the	  Shah	  –	  ushering	  in	  an	  increasingly	  brutal	  regime.	  With	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  CIA,	  the	  Shah	  established	  the	  SAVAK	  –	  a	  secret	  police,	  internal	  security	  and	  intelligence	  service.	  Infamous	  for	  its	  inescapabilty	  and	  brutality,	  the	  organization	  worked	  to	  strengthen	  the	  royalist	  regime	  by	  placing	  political	  opponents	  under	  strict	  surveillance	  and	  repressing	  dissident	  movements.	  As	  Abrahamian	  notes,	  after	  the	  events	  of	  1953,	  “political	  freedom	  in	  Iran	  did	  not	  exist…	  [And]	  the	  overall	  picture	  was	  one	  of	  repression,	  manipulation,	  and	  coercion.”87	  This	  remained	  the	  overriding	  situation	  until	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  in	  1979,	  which	  brought	  an	  end	  the	  Pahlavi	  dynasty	  and	  the	  beginnings	  of	  an	  Islamic	  republic.	  Furthermore,	  upon	  reinstatement	  the	  Shah	  quickly	  worked	  to	  improve	  Iran’s	  affiliation	  with	  the	  West	  by	  assuring	  diplomatic	  loyalty	  and	  adopting	  a	  Western	  economic	  program	  of	  development.	  Iranian	  oil	  was	  denationalization,	  putting	  an	  end	  to	  the	  crisis.	  And	  although	  the	  arrangement	  gave	  Iran	  fifty	  percent	  of	  the	  profits,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Ervand	  Abrahamian,	  Iran	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  revolutions	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	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it	  restored	  Western	  control,	  once	  again	  positioning	  Iran	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  foreign	  power.	  	  The	  haunting	  consequences	  of	  the	  coup	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  fate	  of	  Iran.	  Although	  the	  CIA	  and	  U.S.	  government	  proudly	  deemed	  the	  covert	  operation	  a	  success,	  today	  this	  notion	  of	  “success”	  has	  been	  largely	  tarnished	  in	  light	  of	  the	  arguably	  disastrous	  consequences.	  The	  coup	  of	  Mossadegh	  ultimately	  occasioned	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  United	  States	  as	  the	  major	  regional	  power	  and	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  twenty-­‐five	  years	  of	  close	  relations	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  repressive	  Shah.	  	  While	  Anglo-­‐Iranian	  relations	  were	  restored	  after	  the	  coup,	  British	  dominance	  in	  the	  region	  was	  deteriorating,	  and	  Iran	  was	  quickly	  becoming	  a	  U.S.	  client	  state.	  Under	  pressure	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  British	  were	  forced	  to	  accept	  membership	  in	  a	  consortium	  of	  companies	  –	  many	  of	  which	  were	  U.S.	  based.88	  American	  interference	  in	  Iranian	  domestic	  affairs	  intensified,	  and	  between	  1953	  and	  1963	  the	  U.S.	  provided	  Iran	  with	  $500	  million	  in	  military	  aid.89	  By	  1956	  the	  United	  States	  had	  essentially	  supplanted	  Britain	  as	  the	  major	  foreign	  influence	  in	  Iran	  –	  positioning	  America	  for	  the	  first	  time	  as	  an	  essentially	  imperial	  power	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	   Furthermore,	  before	  1953	  Iranian	  nationals	  –	  including	  Mossadegh	  –	  regarded	  America	  as	  a	  positive	  global	  force	  and	  Britain	  as	  the	  foreign	  enemy.	  Today,	  however,	  the	  majority	  of	  Iranians	  vilify	  the	  two	  powers	  with	  equal	  measure.90	  Unlike	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  there	  was	  a	  tangible	  awareness	  among	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Heiss,	  Empire	  and	  Nationhood,	  219.	  89	  Cleveland	  and	  Bunton,	  A	  history,	  271-­‐272.	  90	  Christopher	  De	  Bellaigue,	  Patriot	  of	  Persia:	  Muhammad	  Mossadegh	  and	  a	  
Very	  British	  Coup	  (Vintage,	  2013),	  6.	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Iranians	  of	  the	  American	  role	  in	  aborting	  nationalist	  leadership	  and	  rescinding	  any	  chances	  of	  an	  organic	  Iranian	  democracy	  free	  of	  foreign	  exploitation.	  Consequently,	  the	  coup	  established	  a	  deeply	  rooted,	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  throughout	  Iran,	  which	  was	  only	  further	  bolstered	  through	  widespread	  knowledge	  of	  continued	  U.S.	  support	  of	  the	  brutal	  royal	  autocracy.	  A	  quarter	  century	  later,	  these	  feelings	  exploded	  in	  Iran	  ushering	  in	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  and	  hostage	  crisis	  –	  when	  an	  angry	  mob	  of	  young	  Islamic	  revolutionaries	  overran	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Tehran,	  taking	  more	  than	  sixty	  Americans	  hostage.	  This	  historical	  context	  –	  seeded	  in	  the	  coup	  d’état	  of	  Premier	  Mossadegh	  –	  remains	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  distrust	  and	  tensions	  between	  the	  United	  Sates	  and	  Iran	  today.	  	  In	  summary,	  echoing	  the	  views	  of	  Washington	  and	  the	  CIA,	  the	  press	  relied	  on	  a	  highly	  internalized,	  bipolar	  and	  ideological	  Cold	  War	  mentality	  of	  American	  Empire	  –	  a	  position	  that	  both	  emphasized	  and	  conflated	  the	  Tudeh	  and	  communist	  threat	  and	  worked	  to	  discredit	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh	  as	  a	  capable	  leader.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  media	  effectively	  and	  convincingly	  presented	  the	  events	  of	  August	  1953	  as	  popular	  uprising	  against	  an	  incapable,	  delusional	  prime	  minister	  too	  sympathetic	  to	  communism.	  However,	  by	  placing	  and	  examining	  the	  coup	  in	  its	  rightful	  context	  –	  as	  a	  product	  of	  the	  oil	  nationalization	  crisis	  –	  it	  becomes	  obvious	  that	  this	  understanding	  was	  ultimately	  false.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  only	  direct	  but	  even	  determinant;	  the	  Tudeh	  threat	  was	  of	  little	  substance;	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minster	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  firm	  nationalist	  and	  advocate	  of	  Iranian	  democracy,	  who	  sought	  to	  break	  with	  a	  history	  of	  dependency	  and	  Western	  influence	  in	  his	  country’s	  economy	  and	  political	  affairs.	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The	  shallow	  and	  false	  story	  offered	  by	  mainstream	  media	  mystified	  the	  coup	  and	  kept	  the	  public	  blind	  to	  its	  realities.	  However,	  it	  is	  the	  subsequent	  silence	  of	  the	  press	  that	  left	  the	  American	  public	  as	  victims	  of	  misrepresentation	  for	  decades	  following	  the	  clandestine	  operation.	  Some	  thirty	  years	  later,	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  reporter	  Kennett	  Love	  reflected:	  “More	  and	  more	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  the	  importance	  now	  of	  what	  happened	  was	  the	  impact	  of	  silence	  on	  history.”91	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  covert	  coup	  d’état	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Prime	  Minister	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh,	  this	  silence	  that	  allowed	  numerous	  falsehoods	  to	  persist	  unchallenged	  in	  public	  spheres	  of	  deliberation,	  that	  enabled	  the	  haunting	  legacies	  to	  go	  unnoticed,	  and	  ultimately	  disguised	  the	  true,	  more	  imperialistic,	  nature	  of	  the	  events	  of	  August	  1953.	  	  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Dorman	  and	  Farhang,	  U.S.	  Press	  and	  Iran,	  62.	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